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BAR BRIEFS

clusion that it has been devoted to a public use and its use thereby in effect
granted to the public.. . . Negatively, it does not mean that a business
is affected with a public interest merely because it is large or because
the public are warranted in having a feeling or concern in respect of its
maintenance ....

The meaning and application of the phrase are exam-

ined at length in the Tyson case, and we see no reason for restating what
is there said.
"In support of the act under review it is urged that gasoline is of
widespread use; that enormous quantities of it are sold in the State of
Tennessee; and that it has become necessary and indispensable in carrying on commercial and other activities within the State. But we are here
concerned with the character of the business, not with its size or the
extent to which the commodity is used. Gasoline is one of the ordinary
commodities of trade, differing, so far as the question here is affected,
in no essential respect from a great variety of other articles commonly
bought and sold by merchants and private dealers in the country. The
decisions referred to above make it perfectly clear that the business of
dealing in such articles, irrespective of its extent, does not come within
the phrase 'affected with a public interest'."

HUMAN RIGHTS-PROPERTY RIGHTS
The phrases "human rights" and "property rights," always more
or less in evidence, are receiving particular consideration just now by
reason of the introduction of the Norris and Shipstead bills in Congress.
One may assume, no doubt, that the inference intended to be drawn
from the use of these two phrases is that there are two classes of rights,
and that there is a peculiar difference between them.
Frankly, we do not know of any property that has rights. We do
know of the right to pursue happiness; we know that, in exercising the
right to pursue happiness, men make use of property; we know, also,
that the right to make legitimate use of property is just as intimately
associated with the human individual as the right to life or liberty.
A denial of the right to make legitimate use of property may not
destroy the property, but what good is it to the individual if he is not
permitted to use it? Are there really two classes of rights, then, except
through the making of arbitrary distinctions, so as to justify the limitation of preventive remedies to one or the other?

WE APOLOGIZE
A practical "jokee" misplaced her fingers when the notice was sent
to Mr. H. F. Homer of Fargo, advising him of his appointment as
Vice-Chairman of the Committee on Citizenship, the designation reading,
"Vice-Chairman for the First Congregational District." Mr. Homer
claims to be a "howling Methodist," insists that we assume responsibility
for the error, and demands that we give proper publicity to the correction.
Fear of what may otherwise be in store for us causes us to make this
public apology. As we are in the same category as Mr. Homer, however,
we are not certain whether the apology should be to Mr. Homer or to
the Congregational District, so we just apologize generally.

